JUSTICE-UNLAWFUL EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION EXCLUDED UNDER MIRANDA-TESTIMONIAL INCOURT CONFESSION "IMPELLED" BY THE ADMISSION OF THE
JUVENILE

INVALID CONFESSION INTO EVIDENCE. In re Teters, (Cal. 1968).

On April 30, 1967, Tom Lee Teters, age fourteen, and a
companion ran away from home. They "hot wired" the ignition of
an unlocked car and drove off. After running out of gas, they
removed a pistol and items of personal property from the car and
fled on foot.
Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff's patrol picked up the boys.
They were found to be runaways, and brought to the Sheriff's office
to await the arrival of their parents. Asked about the abandoned
car, Teters made his first admission that he had taken it. The boy
was then advised of his constitutional rights as prescribed in
Miranda v. Arizona,I after which he made a second confession.
At the hearing, Teters, represented by counsel, took the stand
in his own behalf, and made a third confession with regard to
taking the car. He was subsequently declared a ward of the juvenile
court.2 On appeal to the Third District Court of Appeals, held,
reversed; the due process requirements of Miranda3 were violated,
in that the "extrajudicial confessions impelled the testimonial one."
In re Teters, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 951, 957, 70 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753
(1968).
i. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The case holds that when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the police he must be
warned of his right to remain silent, and of his right to the presence of an attorney, or to have
an attorney appointed to him if he is indigent prior to questioning. Absent these warnings,
any evidence obtained as a result of the questioning is invalid and may not be used against
him.
2. Teters came within the provisions of section 602 of the CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE (West 1966) in that he violated the laws of the state of California, namely the CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 10852 (west 1960), (Breaking or Removing Vehicle Parts). CAL.
WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 602 (West 1966) describes a minor who has violated a local or
state law or one who has previously been found a person described in section 601 (habitually
disobedient minors) and has failed to obey an order of the juvenile court.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is curious to note that, at one point, the court stated that it
was true the officer testified that the defendant was not a "suspect" regarding the auto theft,
and then went on in the next paragraph to state that the boys were "suspects." It is fair to
observe, nevertheless, that even if the court is imposing its own thinking in order to judicially
bootstrap the case, the court is also applying the ratio decidendi of Miranda; i.e., "[b]y
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id. at 444.

1969]

CASE NOTES

Since adult and juvenile law are grounded in principles that are
often diametrically opposed, a preliminary sketch of juvenile court
theory will aid in an appreciation of the issues raised in Teters. As
one writer points out:
The juvenile court philosophy is theoretically based on the
merging of two doctrines: the equitable concept of parens
patriae4 and the common law presumption of limited capacity of
children to form the requisite criminal intent. Parens patriae
was derived from the assumption that children were wards of the
state and needed special protection.
A basic premise of current California law6 is that a juvenile
proceeding is technically civil and not criminal in nature.' For
example, "[T]he application of the preponderance of evidence rule
rather than the reasonable doubt test of section 1096 of the Penal
Code to determine that the minor has committed a crime under
section 602 of the Juvenile Court Law is not violative of his constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection of the
laws."' However, the modern trend seems to favor stricter procedural requirements in juvenile adjudication, particularly in areas
where constitutional issues frequently arise. In this regard, one
writer states that: "[T]he United States Supreme Court has recently decided that most of the criminal procedural protections required by due process (e.g., the right to adequate notice and counsel, the right not to incriminate oneself, and the right of confronta4. A classic California case in the field of juvenile litigation discusses the protective
attitude of the courts towards juvenile offenders in terms of parens patriae. People v.
Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 895, 299 P.2d 875, 877 (1956). Generally, juvenile offenses are not
considered criminal in nature and are handled by the juvenile court "in the nature of
guardianship proceedings in which the state as parens patriaeseeks to relieve the minor of
the stigma of a criminal conviction and to give him corrective care, supervision, and training."
5. BOCHES & J. GOLDFARB, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE, 18 § 7 (1st ed.
1968) (A publication of the State of California's CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR).
[Hereinafter cited as BOCHES & GOLDFARB]. Note also that The Juvenile Delinquency
Prevention and Control Act of 1968 provided that the purpose of the act was "to assist
courts, correctional institutions, law enforcement agencies, and other agencies having
responsibilities with respect to delinquent youths and youths in danger of becoming
delinquent . . ." (emphasis added). Pub. L. No. 90-445, § 111, 82 Stat. 462, Act of July
31, 1968. For an excellent discussion of the ramifications of juvenile justice in the U.S., see
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice,
79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
6. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE, §§ 500-945 (Vest 1966).
7. See J.L. GODDARD, 5 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE § 1383 (Supp. 1968).
8. Id. at 66 § 1383. In criminal cases proof of guilt must be made beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainity. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (Vest 1956).
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tion and cross-examination) are also applicable" 9 to juveniles. It is
speculative as to how far the courts 'Will extend adult criminal
procedure. Yet it seems accurate to predict that future judicial
inquiry, relating to stricter procedural rules in juvenile proceedings,
will involve questions such as; "[B]ail pending the hearing, a jury
trial, the presumption of innocence, and the right to demand that

the proof of his alleged violation be beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a moral certainty."' 0 It is against this background of recent
reform in the field ofjuvenile law and in the context of the historical
development of the theory of parenspatriaethat In re Teters was
handed down.

The issues before the court concerned the admissibility, under
constitutional objection, of three confessions, the first and third of
which form the primary subject of this note. In reaching its
decision, the court did not discuss.the second confession, although
it was made incident to a proper Miranda admonition. In fact, the
officers even surpassed the Miranda requirement when they asked
Teters whether he "understood" the warning." He replied that he
did and that he was willing to waive his constitutional privileges. 2

In an adult proceeding such evidence might be excluded on the
theory that the second confession was the fruit of the first, and
therefore inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. 3 Although it has been suggested that this rule should

apply to juvenile proceedings, the prevailing California rule is to the
contrary. 4 This indicates that the second confession amounted to
9.

BOCHES & GOLDFARB, supra note 5, at 15, § 2.
10. Gardner, Gault and California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 527, 539 (1968).
11. In re Teters, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 951,954,70 Cal. Rptr. 749,751 (1968).
12. Id.
13. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), where the Court held that if a
declaration sought to be introduced is the result of unlawful police action (illegal entry and
arrest), the declaration is the fruit of the unlawful search and seizure and therefore is
inadmissible, and further, if this declaration led to a third person who voluntarily disclosed
contraband, the contraband is also deemed inadmissible. Id. at 487-88.
14. In this regard, at least one California appellate court suggests that the "poisonous
tree doctrine" is applicable in juvenile proceedings. In re Rambeau, 266 Adv. Cal. App. 455,
72 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968). Seealso In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 161,267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 98
(Family Ct. 1966) (dictum);
ITIhere is no reason why the exclusionary rule . . . should not be equally
applicable to a juvenile, who, by reason of his immaturity, stands in much
greater need of protection from unwarranted police interrogation than an adult.

cf. B. WITKIN,

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA SUBSTANTIVE LAW,

1967).
See also Norman

261 (Ist ed.

Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53
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substantive and probative.evidence which was. not discussed by the
court. It is unclear whether this lack of discussion reflects the
court's distrust of confessions by minors,' 5 an oversight in the
court's independent evaluation of the evidence, or some other
motive. It is clear though, that a discussion of the second confession
might have rendered an exclusion of confessions one and three
moot, assuming that confession two was unobjectionable. 6 In light
of the court's limited analysis of this aspect of the case, the present
inquiry will be concerned with the conclusion that confessions one
and three were inadmissible.
With respect to the first confession, the court held that the
admission of this confession, which was not made incident to the
Miranda admonition, caused undue prejudice to the defendant's
case and would require reversal, unless sufficient evidence of guilt
existed independent of the invalid confession.1 7 This reasoning is
consistent with recent landmark decisions which have emphasized
principles of fairness and procedural due process in juvenile
proceedings." Therefore, if two policies are in conflict-a policy
which guarantees constitutional due process to the citizen whose
liberty is at stake, and a policy which permits the admission of
relevant but prejudicial evidence-the former should prevail. To
A.B.A.J. 811 (1967), who suggests that in the post Gault era the exclusionary rule is likely to
be invoked, particularly in view of the conceptual link between the fourth and fifth
amendments. Id. at 814. cf. BoCHES & GOLDFARB, at 122 § 130, which states that:
[t]he 'fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine' [footnotes omitted] should apply in
juvenile courts to the same extent as in criminal courts, so that evidence obtained
as a consequence of an unlawful search and seizure or an illegally obtained
extrajudicial confession should be excluded.
Contra. T. Wealch, Kent & Gault: Two Decisions in Search of a Theory, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 29, 44 (1968).
15. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 (1967), which states that
lw]ith respect to juveniles, both common observation and expert opinion
emphasize that 'distrust of confessions' made in certain situations . . . is
imperative in the case of children from an early age through adolescence
(dictum) (footnotes omitted).
16. J. GODDARD, at 74 § 1418.5 states that, "[a] minor is not incompetent as a matter
of law to waive his constitutional rights to remain silent even though there is no consent to
the waiver by an attorney, parent, or guardian. .. " cf. People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432
P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
17. This statement is an application of the rule stated in In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d
402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966) where wardship was affirmed because, disregarding the illegal
confessions, there was sufficient evidence to support the order. Note also that in Teters, 264
Adv. Cal. App. at 957, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 753 (1968), the court states that the extrajudicial
confessions were invalid-yet later in the opinion (264 Adv. Cal. App. at 962, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 756) concern seems to be with only one confession.
18. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. . See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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this extent, the ultimate holding in the case, insofar as the court
finds that the admission of the invalid confession constitutes
prejudicial error,'9 seems proper and in accord with the general
principles of fairness and procedural due process propounded in
Gault and other recent juvenile cases.20
Teters initially cited In re Castro for the proposition that,
"[a]ll evidence bearing on the questions at issue is admissible by the
express provisions of the sections, but the utilization of the evidence
by the court is strictly controlled."'" The authority which the
Castrocourt recognized for this rule is section 701 of the Cal. Welf.
& Inst'ns Code.22 According to one writer, section 701 represents an
effort by the California legislature to bridge the gap between the
parens patriaetheory of the social welfare advocates and the criticisms of the constitutionalists.
Any matter or information relevant and material to the
circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring him within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be
received in evidence; however, a preponderance of evidence,
legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, must be adduced
to support a finding that the minor is a person described by
section 602, and a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible
in the trial of civil cases must be adduced to support a finding
that the minor is a person described by section 600 or 601.23
The rationale behind the apparent anomaly which permits an
invalid confession (as well as other incompetent evidence) to be
admissible in a juvenile hearing traditionally stems from the Cal.
Welf. & Inst'ns Code's unique provisions for a bifurcated hearing.24
In the first part of the hearing, the court establishes jurisdiction
over the minor.25 At this stage the court must determine if the
minor is a "neglected or dependent minor," a minor "showing a
tendency toward delinquency," or a minor who has committed
what would constitute a crime were he an adult.26 It is during the
19. But note that the admission of the invalid confession into evidence constituted
reversible error since there was insufficient evidence exclusive of the invalid confession. See
In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1966).
20. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541.
21. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 411. Regarding the limited use of this evidence, see note 22
infra.

23. Id. at § 701 (emphasis added). See Gardner, supra note 10, at 527, 537.
24. CAL. WELF & INST'NS CODE § 701-02
25. Id. at § 701.
26. Id. at § 701.

(Vest

1966).
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jurisdictional or initial stage of the hearing that incompetent
evidence is admissible." The justification seems to be that relaxed
rules of evidence are conducive to effective fact-finding." This view
is also grounded in the premise that the state stands as parens
patriaewith respect to the wayward minor, and that the criminal
stigma of a formal trial is not present. 9
Notwithstanding the statutory language in section 701 which
permits the introduction of incompetent evidence during the
jurisdictional stage of the hearing, there is a lack of uniformity in
California juvenile courts regarding the correct interpretation of
the section. 0 In noting this lack of consistency, the 1968 edition of
the Continuing Education of the Bar's publication on California
Juvenile Court Practiceadvises:
Since an increasing number of California juvenile courts are
now applying strict rules of evidence at the time the evidence is
offered and are excluding incompetent evidence, counsel should
in most cases ignore Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 701 and make his
objections to incompetent evidence as if he were in an adult
court. Many juvenile courts are, however, admitting [illegal
confessions] .

. .

. Counsel must be prepared, in those courts,

to state the constitutional grounds for his objections for the
3
record, should he subsequently decide to seek review .
27. Id. at § 701.
28. See In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d at 410, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (1966) where the
court states:

[t]hat this particular wording of § 701 of the

WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS

as it now exists was not inadvertent but was thoroughly considered and
designed to do exactly what on its face it purports to do is shown by a reference
to the report of the 1959-60 Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile
Justice, part 1, pages 29 and 30, which recommended detailed changes resulting
in the Juvenile Court Act of 1961, where it is said: 'The problem in attempting to
establish acceptable juvenile court procedures is to attain a working balance
between two essential objectives-first, preserving the guarantee of due process
to the minor; and second, establishing an informal court atmosphere so that
potentially harmful effects of the proceedings are minimized and the minor's
receptivity to treatment is encouraged (footnotes omitted).
29. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 409, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
If the procedure based on the Escobedo. Dorado, and Mirandacases should be
held to apply in all strictness to juveniles and juvenile proceedings in order to
exclude confessions made to peace officers, the doctrine df parens patriae
would become a hollow phrase and the juvenile court simply a young people's
criminal court in every situation such as the present.
30. BoCHES & GOLDFARB, supra note 4, at 120, 125.
3 1. Id. In addition, Gardner states that,
The obvious question is whether under Gault, there could still be admitted
constitutionally prohibited, illegally obtained evidence, the admission of which
would be reversible error in the adult courts. ..
GARDNER, supranote 10, at 537.
CODE
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By virtue of the fact that Teters cites passages from Castro
which specifically approve the latitude allowed by the broad
language of the statute, it is reasonable to conclude that Teters
similarly approves the statute. It is important to note, however,
that in Castro, the court had no reason to question the validity of
the statute since the admissibility of the illegal confession into
evidence was not held to be prejudicial error?2 In this respect the
Castrocourt concluded that:
[T]he procedure expounded in the Escobedo, Dorado, and
Mirandacases does not apply to juvenile court litigation so as to
require the reversal of any proceeding in which the evidence of
confession to a peace officer has been admitted without proof of
the preliminary warnings required in criminal cases."
Teters, on the other hand, found that the admissibility of the invalid
confession was "erroneous" and "prejudicial" to the constitutional
interests of the minor, and required reversal.34 Even if the court
did not dispose of the statute on the grounds that it violated due
process, the court's concern with prejudicial error35 suggested a
fundamental difficulty with the operation of the statute.
Rather than criticize the statute, however, the court drew
analogies to rules and procedures in several adult, criminal cases.
The danger that sound theories and procedures of juvenile law may
be inadvertently undermined or distorted requires that analysis of
juvenile theory be definitive and judicially restrained. In contrast to
this approach, Teters cited several adult criminal cases which were
(a) not faced with the problem of a unique statute which permitted
the introduction of prejudicial evidence so long as it met the test of
relevancy, and (b) not faced with the theories and procedures
involved in juvenile law.
For instance, Teters relied heavily on People v. Spencer,36 an

adult criminal case, which stands for the proposition that a
defendant's extrajudicial confession, "erroneously" admitted into
evidence, "impells" the testimonial one. The Spencer court found
that the unlawful use of an invalid confession in a jury trial
completely shatters the defendant's case and precludes a finding of
harmless error notwithstanding overwhelming extrinsic evidence of
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

243 Cal. App. 2d at 409, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (1966).
Id.
264 Adv. Cal. App. at 960, 962, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 755 (1968).
264 Adv. Cal. App. at 960-61, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 755 (1968).
66 Cal. 2d at 167,424 P.2d at 215, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
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guilt." This court applied the rule recently announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, another adult
case, that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
"reasonable doubt" that the illegal confession did not contribute to
the verdict by causing the second confession." Spencer, citing
United States v. Bayer" adds that; "[a]fter the accused has once let
the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the
inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and
practical disadvantage of having confessed. He can never get the cat
back in the bag. The secret is out for good. 40
That these analogies to adult cases supported the ultimate
ruling insofar as the minor's constitutional privilege against selfincrimination was infringed is clear. However the court failed to
distinguish certain aspects of adult procedural law from juvenile
law. For example: (1) The extrajudicial confession in Spencer was
erroneously admitted. In Teters the admission was also erroneous
because it violated procedural due process. However the court in
4
Teters failed to consider the statutory test of relevancy '
which heretofore distinguished juvenile from adult proceedings. (2)
Spencer went to trial in 1963. This date is significant because his
attorney "could not have known that his previous confession
should have been excluded, and that its introduction constituted
reversible error. ' 42 On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume
that, in 1967, with both Miranda and Gault decided, Teters'
counsel knew that the illegal confession, although admissible under
section 701, was not competent evidence in determining whether
his client should be made a ward of the court.43 (3) Spencer was
essentially concerned with the effect the erroneously admitted
confession had on the jury.44 Teters, on the other hand, was an
informal, judge-tried proceeding. There should not have been this
same concern with prejudice regarding the judge-tried proceeding
because the judge is presumed, theoretically, to render a decision
37. 66 Cal. 2d at 167,424 P.2d at 215,57 Cal. Rptr. at 171.

38. 386 U.S. at 24.
39.
40.
41.
42.

331 U.S. at 540-41.
Id.
§ 701.
66 Cal. 2d at 169, 424 P.2d at 721, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 169.

43. § 701.
44. According to Spencer, "we could not, in order to shield the resulting conviction
from reversal, separate what he told the jury on the witness stand from what he confessed to
the police during interrogation." 66 Cal. 2d at 168,424 P.2d at 720, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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without being influenced by prejudicial evidence. (4) A final

distinction is that early in the Teters opinion, the court correctly
observed that the quantum of proof required in a juvenile
proceeding is a "preponderance of the evidence. 451However the
court later cites People v. Spencer and Chapman v. California for
the proposition that the prosecution has the burden of proving

beyond a "reasonable doubt" that the causative link between the
legal and the illegal confession has been broken. 4 The court's

reference to the quantum of proof in an adult case as a source of
authority to reach a conclusion in a juvenile case creates at best,
ambiguity, and at worst, a failure to recognize the fundamental

theories and purposes upon which the two approaches are
47
grounded.

In addition to the foregoing distinction, the use of adult
criteria by the court in Teters seems to raise more questions than it
answers: (1) The State, in a juvenile case, now bears the burden of
showing that "the causative link between the two confessions had
been broken." 41 At least in California, however, there is some doubt
whether the breaking of the "causative link" between a legal and
an illegal confession will be sufficient to accord due process.49 (2) A
procedural imponderable is reserved for the juvenile court judge:
how does a judge receive as evidence an1 otherwise legal confession
45. 264 Adv. Cal. App. at 957, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
46. Id. at 961, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
47. Under § 701, the applicable burden of proof is a "preponderance of the evidence,"
even in WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 cases. In re Jones, 256 Adv. Cal. App. 260, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (1967) held that proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" was not constitutionally
required. This question was recently before the United States Supreme Court in In re
Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968), but the case was remanded to the state court with
instructions to apply In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). At this date, therefore, the applicable
standard of proof in California remains unchanged. Contra, Santana v. Texas, 431 S.W.2d
558, 560 (Tex. Crim. 1968) which concludes that "the underlying reasoning of Gault
logically requires that a determination of delinquency is valid only when the facts of
delinquency are proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence as now required by the present Texas decisions."
48. 264 Adv. Cal. App. at 961, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
49. For a discussion of the ambiguity regarding the application of the correct rule to
test the prejudicial effect of the illegal confessions, see 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1153-54 (1968):
Although the court in Spencer invoked the federal rule to test the prejudicial
effect of the confession, the prevailing opinion in People v. Charles [66 Adv. Cal.
325, 425 P.2d 545, 57 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1967)] a later California Supreme Court
case, used the California test of prejudice . . . . Under the California rule the
prosecution is estopped from proving lack of causal connection between the
improperly admitted confession and the verdict. The court will probably
distinguish the state and federal rules more precisely in the future.
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once the police have inadvertently obtained an invalid but
admissible one under section 701? In recognizing this problem, one
writer notes that, "[c]omplete fairness seems to require that the
police inform the defendant not only that the prior confession itself
is inadmissible at trial, but also that any evidence obtained as a
result of the wrongfully obtained confession would likewise be
inadmissible.'" 0 Such a proposal contemplates a major extension of
the Miranda warning and increases the technical prerequisites for
the admission of confessions. This result may run counter to a
fundamental premise of Gault which emphasizes substance over
form. 1 (3) The court has confused the applicable standard of proof
in juvenile cases by suggesting that with some issues (i.e., breaking,
the causative link between the legal and illegal confession) a higher
standard of proof is required. 2 (4) Most important, Teters has
declared that the admission into evidence of an unlawful confession
is erroneous without reconciling the holding with the statute which
says it is not erroneous. The salient issue, the propriety of section
701, was not considered and will probably continue to plague the
juvenile courts.
The objections to the court's reliance on adult cases as a frame
of reference from which to resolve problems in juvenile law are
twofold. First, it is inconsistent with juvenile theory and practice to
adopt rules and standards that are "criminal" in substance.53
Secondly, while the court noted thatthe admission of the invalid
confession into evidence prejudiced the minor, the court failed to
critically confront the statutory authority which permits this
admission.
For these reasons it would seem preferable that an appellate
court, confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an invalid
confession in a juvenile hearing, focus its attention on the
constitutionality of section 701. Such evidence, although admissible under this statute for limited purposes, prejudices the constitutional interests of the minor and therefore must be excluded from
the entire hearing as a matter of law. Until the legislature amends
section 701 to conform to procedural due process, the lower courts
50. See 55 CALIF. L. REv. at 1155.
51. 387 U.S. at 49.
52. Cases cited note 47 supra.
53. This is a reference to the fact that Teters cited language in several adult cases
without recognition of the juvenile theories and rules which distinguish the adult case; e.g.,
the proper standard of proof issue raised supra, note 47.
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should be directed to ignore the objectionable portion of the statute.
If this approach had been followed in Teters, the wardship would
have been dismissed, the constitutional interests of the minor would
have been protected, juvenile law in California would have been
uniformly applied, and a troublesome statute would have been
clarified. The fundamental issue in the case, the validity of section
701 as it relates to the fifth amendment privileges of the minor,
could have been resolved. As one writer suggests: "[o]ne may predict with confidence that extrajudicial statements which are obtained in violation of the confession rules will in the future be held
inadmissible in juvenile hearings. 54 Whether the proper solution in
such a case is to circumvent the fundamental issue and find that the
illegal confession "impelled" the testimonial one, is at least
questionable. Full constitutional protection for the minor,
concomitant with the theory behind parens patriae, can be
achieved. Clarification of section 701, insofar as it is repugnant to
standards of due process, is desirable. A direct challenge to this
constitutionally questionable statute would be a significant
contribution to the future of juvenile law in California.
EDWARD J. PULASKI, JR.

54. BOCHES & GOLDFARB, supra note 5, at 121, §"127.

